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New evidence on the institutional causes of economic growth: 
Using peer pressure to unbundle institutions across countries 
Savva Shanaeva, Roseline Wanjirua 
a University of Northumbria at Newcastle, UK 
Abstract 
This study presents a new framework of assessing the causal effect of institutions on economic 
growth via exploiting the exogenous variation in institutions triggered by “peer pressure” 
exerted on governments by other states, affecting policy decisions and the environment national 
and international businesses operate in. The applied method reinforces the importance of 
institutional factors for economic outcomes and allows to effectively address the data quality 
and instrument validity concerns surrounding earlier studies. Most importantly, the “peer 
pressure” method allows to distinguish between influences of various institutions, answering 
not only the question whether, but also which institutions do matter for growth. The study shows 
that the proposed method has significant power to “unbundle institutions” and finds that 
property rights protection and financial freedom are more important for growth than democracy, 
constraint on the executive, legal origins, or business freedom, even when controlled for human 
capital. The developed method has significant applicability in future research of institutional 
and cultural impact on international business and economic outcomes.  
Keywords: economic growth; instrumental variables; institutions; international trade; political 
pressure; property rights 
JEL codes: C26, E02, O43, O47 
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Twenty years of acknowledging institutions: international business and economics perspectives 
The importance of the institutional factors for international business and the macroeconomic 
performance in general has been acknowledge in the literature for almost two decades now 
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008; Aguilera and Groggard, 2019). 
The paradigm of institutional business and economics research has been developing rapidly, 
with the notion that “institutions matter” being obvious and well-proven from multiple studies 
and lines of inquiry, both macroeconomic and firm-level (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Aguilera and 
Groggard, 2019b). However, there is still no consensus in the literature on which and how these 
institutional factor shape economic and international business outcomes, with “unbundling 
institutions” becoming a very important challenge for contemporary researchers in this 
multidisciplinary field (Rodrik et al., 2004; Bhattacharyya, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2019b).  
This study fills the gap in the existing literature by conceptualising the methodology to address 
some of the recent debates and issues in the area, such as disentangling the effects of various 
institutions (Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008), acknowledging 
institutional spillovers (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019b), institutional drift (Aguilera and 
Groggard, 2019), the determinants of institutional change (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019a), and 
the causality issue (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008). To successfully 
tackle this research question, the study turns to a multidisciplinary approach, utilising and 
improving upon the techniques used in new institutional economics, while acknowledging the 
concepts elaborated in the field of international business.  
 
Twenty years of instrumenting for institutions: advances and challenges 
The identification of adequate instrumental variables for measures of institutions has been a 
major staple in empirical research in development economics at least since Hall and Jones 
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(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). As institutions are endogenous regressors, the consensus in 
the literature agrees that OLS estimates of institutional impact on economic growth are proven 
to be inconsistent, constituting a textbook case where experimental evidence or IV estimators 
might resolve the issue (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Since laboratory experiments in 
macroeconomics are obviously impossible, researchers utilise quasi-natural experiments and 
instrumental variable methods to isolate exogenous variation in institutions and therefore to 
obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the causal impact of institutions on growth. 
However, the definition of instrumental variables of sufficient quality has proven to be quite 
challenging.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) propose the famous “log settler mortality” variable as an 
instrument for institutions, namely protection against expropriation, constraint on the executive, 
law and order, and judiciary efficiency, to study the institutional causes of economic 
development in 69 ex-colonies. They argue that territories where early colonists experienced 
higher mortality prohibited active European settlement and incentivised the establishment of 
tyrannical colonial administration aimed at extracting rents from local populations that have 
been preserved through centuries in various forms. Conversely, low mortality led to a different 
form of colonisation, where settlers could populate the area and import more inclusive European 
institutions such as rule of law, protection of property rights, and the system of “checks and 
balances” to facilitate their own economic activity. Log settler mortality has been found to be a 
sufficient instrument in explaining the cross-country variation in institutions, simple first-stage 
regressions yielding adjusted R-squared in range from 0.17 to 0.51 for different institutional 
variables. TSLS estimates of the causal effects of institutions on economic development were 
two to three times higher than respective OLS estimates (Acemoglu et al., 2001). This study 
has been extremely influential and spurred continuous academic discussions. Acemoglu et al.’s 
(2001) has been criticised across multiple well-identifiable lines of argument.  
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First, as shown by Glaeser et al. (2004), log settler mortality might not be a truly exogeneous 
instrument. Apart from institutional quality, initial mortality of colonists might have influenced 
another important determinant of economic growth, namely, human capital stock. Early settlers 
that chose to stay could bring with them not only the tradition of property rights protection, but 
also their superior knowledge, skills, and practices. Moreover, it can be puzzling that log settler 
mortality adequately predicts various economic institutions, but is markedly worse at 
explaining the variations in political institutions, such as proportional representation or popular 
democracy. It is therefore unclear why colonists successfully imported one strain of institutions 
but failed to transfer the other. Moreover, settler mortality (similarly to latitude, a variable 
sometimes also used to instrument for institutions) is associated with prominent geographical 
and climatic factors that can also be crucial in explaining cross-country differences in per capita 
income (McArthur and Sachs, 2001). Primarily, it has been evidenced that the presence of the 
tsetse fly has continuously crippled African agriculture and economic development (Alsan, 
2015). Furthermore, as Europeans brought their “guns, germs, and steel” with them in addition 
to their institutional practices, it is decidedly unclear through which channel settler mortality 
did shape long-term economic growth (Glaeser et al., 2004). For example, some recent evidence 
from a regional study in the island of Java, Indonesia shows that the areas where Dutch colonists 
have established sugar factories in the XIX century remain wealthier and more industrialised 
today, more than 70 years since Indonesia has gained independence (Dell and Olken, 2017). 
Dell and Olken (2017) show that this result is robust to geographic and climatic factors via 
respective placebo test, and attribute this effect to human capital accumulation and 
infrastructural development. Therefore, log settler mortality becomes a questionable 
instrument, at best, given its potential correlation with climatic and geographical factors and 
initial human capital accumulation. Similar discussions emerged surrounding nearly all 
variables used to instrument for institutions. As such, the linguistic measures of Hall and Jones 
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(1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003) (fraction of populations speaking English or other 
European language as a first or a second language) can be subject to a similar criticism, as 
language skills are correlated with human capital (a more educated population is more likely to 
learn foreign languages) as well as be an endogenous variable in the first place (modern 
European migrants having a higher propensity to move into wealthier countries with better 
institutions). In the same fashion, using resource abundance as an instrument, motivated by a 
well-known “resource curse” phenomenon, with high rents tempting governments to adopt 
extractive institutions (Kolstad, 2009; Guriev et al., 2012), can be debatable as natural resources 
might also factor into the production function directly as an input (Rodrik et al., 2004). 
Therefore, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding verifiability and replicability of 
the instrumental variable construction. Reflecting the necessary requirements for an adequate 
instrumental variable identified in Angrist and Krueger (2001), a would be a process that can 
produce an instrumental variable that cannot plausibly be correlated with any other determinant 
of economic growth (such as geography, climate, human capital, infrastructure, etc.) and is 
clearly corresponding to one particular institutional variable.  
Second, there are significant criticisms directed at the Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) dataset and 
variable definition. Albouy (2012) shows that the settler mortality data is largely inadequate, as 
it treats mortality rates of bishops, soldiers in barracks, and soldiers on campaign as comparable. 
Furthermore, sometimes that study fails to annualise mortality rates in some cases and 
extrapolating rates from different territories onto others, the most prominent example perhaps 
being assigning a mortality rate from mainland China to Hong Kong (Albouy, 2012). The 
estimates are also very sensitive to log settler mortality variable definition, with results ceasing 
to be statistically significant when some of the highest and most questionable observations are 
excluded from the sample (Albouy, 2012). Fails and Kriekhaus (2010) criticise the sample 
choice of Acemoglu et al. (2010) from a different perspective: they show that if city-states such 
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as Hong Kong and Singapore as well as unconventional colonies such as Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and United States are removed from the sample, the first-stage regression 
between institutional quality and settler mortality ceases to be significant. The notion that 
economic institutions in high-mortality colonies were particularly extractive is also highly 
debatable: Frankema (2010) examines taxation levels in colonies and metropoles and argues 
the tax burden has been lower in all of the colonies, and therefore the “extractive institutions” 
claim is invalid. This corresponds to another strain of institutional economics literature, relating 
“state capacity”, i.e. the ability of the government to enforce order and collect taxes, to current 
economic outcomes (Bessley and Persson, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 
2017). This approach emphasises the foundational role of the state as the engine of economic 
development rather than the traditional new institutional approach that focuses on government 
constraints as facilitators to long-term growth. However, these studies can be also subject to 
same criticisms of instrument endogeneity outlined above. Therefore, there is a significant gap 
in the literature regarding verifiability and replicability of the instrumental variable 
construction. An ideal case would be a process that computes instrumental variables for all 
countries based on the same data source so the results are directly comparable across countries.  
Acemoglu et al. (2014) addressed this concern by revising their data and approach to include 
human capital variables and capping mortality estimates at 250 per 1,000. Their results 
reinforced the relative importance of institutions and showed that human capital impact is three 
to four times lower in TSLS than in OLS regressions, while the estimate of the institutional 
effect remains virtually unchanged with the inclusion of human capital and a variety of controls. 
Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2014) suggested another instrument for institutions – initial 
population density – that is arguably better suited for their theory. In regions with high 
population density, Europeans could rely on exploiting the labour of ingenious populations, 
thus establishing extractive institutions. If population density was low, however, colonists had 
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to subsist on their own work and therefore had to imitate more inclusive institutions of the 
metropoles. Nevertheless, Albouy (2012) argues that the new dataset does not correct the most 
impactful mistakes of the initial paper and therefore the results are still not reliable enough. As 
for the educational instruments, Acemoglu et al.’s (2014) choice of using data on Christian 
missions is also questionable. While missionaries, especially Protestants, undoubtedly 
facilitated education in target regions, it is not the only channel though which missionary 
activity could contribute to economic growth. For example, Woodberry (2012) and Woodberry 
and Shah (2004) show that countries with more intensive Protestant missionary activity are 
more likely to become democracies, and therefore Protestantism might be not an exogenous 
instrument for human capital. Nevertheless, many subsequent studies replicated the approach 
of two separate instruments for instruments and human capital, using log settler mortality or 
population density for the former and various measures of missionary activity for the latter 
(Rodrik et al., 2004).  
Third, Acemoglu et al.’s (2001, 2005, 2014) methodology is only applicable to ex-colonies. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) study a 69-country sample, while Rodrik et al. (2004) show that their 
analysis can be at best extended to a sample with 80 observations. While such a sample arguably 
allows to generate consistent and significant estimates, its representativeness remains 
questionable. Log population density, suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2014) in their later study, 
does not resolve the issue, as estimates of initial ingenious populations are also limited, capping 
the sample at 62 observations. Rodrik et al. (2004) suggest expanding the sample to 140 
countries by abandoning log settler mortality and utilising Hall and Jones’s (1999) linguistic 
variable instead, however there is a clear trade-off, as this instrument’s exogeneity is even more 
debatable. Another gap in the literature, therefore, revolves around small sample sizes: as 
exogenous instruments are computed from historical data, they are by definition heavily 
restricted by data availability (such as limiting the sample with ex-colonies alone). On the other 
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hand, an instrumental variable that could be derived from current data can resolve this notable 
issue. 
Finally, another prominent limitation of existing instrumental variable strategies is their 
ambiguity related to particular types of institutions. Currently, there exist dozens of various 
institutional indicators, measuring various facets of democracy (Polity project), economic 
institutions (Heritage economic freedom index), rule of law (World Justice Project), and ease 
of doing business (World Economic Forum). All of them are potentially relevant for economic 
growth, and most of them are perhaps being influenced by distant historical factors that manifest 
themselves in classical instrumental variables. However, there are few instruments that are 
unique to only one institutional measure, therefore disentangling the impact of various 
institutions becomes problematic and ambiguous. For econometric estimation purposes, if there 
is a variety of institutional indices and one instrument related to all of them, it is impossible to 
estimate a model with all institutional regressors as the system of equations is under-identified 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). One of the notable exceptions is the “legal origins” dummy 
variable, distinguishing between common and civil law countries and closely related to British 
or French colonial institutions, respectively (La-Porta et al., 2008). In the mid-2000s, a body of 
literature has become emerging that seeks to “unbundle” the effect of different institutions. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distinguish between “political institutions” – constraint on the 
executive, which, as they argue, is a proxy for property rights, instrumented with log settler 
mortality or initial population density – and “contracting institutions” – legal framework 
facilitating private contracts between agents, instrumented with the legal origins dummy. It is 
shown that among these two institutional variables, “political institutions” are relevant for 
growth, while “contracting institutions” are not. Rodrik (2005) classifies the institutional mix 
policymakers might implement into appropriate incentives, market-based competition, property 
rights protection, and sound money, arguing that in theory these objectives can be pursued and 
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fulfilled independently. Bhattacharyya (2009) modifies Rodrik’s (2005) approach and uses 
different measures for market-creating, market-legitimising, market-regulating, and market-
stabilising institutions while also controlling for human capital. Bhattacharyya (2009) uses 
classical linguistic instruments (Hall and Jones, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2003), log settler 
mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), and latitude to instrument for the set of endogenous variables, 
finding that market-creating and market-stabilising institutions are important for growth, while 
the effect of market-legitimising and market-regulating institutions is limited. However, 
Bhattacharyya (2009) reports severe multicollinearity in some estimations, citing near linear 
dependence in institutions or instrumental variables as a reason. Therefore, multicollinearity 
tests, such as variance inflation factor reporting, can be considered crucial for future studies on 
“unbundling institutions”. Some simpler studies feature OLS regressions to determine which 
institutions alleviate the “resource curse” issue. Kolstad (2009) shows that rule of law does 
mitigate the adverse economic effects of resource abundance while democratic institutions do 
not. Another notable issue in the literature is lack of good-quality instruments for democracy. 
As such, Acemoglu et al. (2019) had to resort to GMM models (that notably create synthetic 
instruments from lagged dependent and independent variables) to measure the economic effects 
of democratisation and illustrated that it does increase GDP per capita by 20% in the long run. 
Therefore, the inconclusive and fragmented literature on “unbundling institutions” proves that 
the field would certainly benefit from the establishment of a theoretically plausible and 
empirically sound one-to-one correspondence (bijection) between a set of institutional variables 
and their instruments.  
 
Using external pressure as a source of exogenous variation: international trade 
The main reason why a study would like to utilise IV estimations is regressor endogeneity 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Indeed, even Acemoglu et al. (2014) themselves cite the 
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competing institutional theories of North (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1991; North et al., 
2009), stating that institutions lead, and economic development follows, and Lipset (1959), 
arguing essentially the opposite in his famous “prerequisites to democracy” concept. In 
international business studies, the endogeneity issue is raised by Henisz and Swaminathan 
(2008), when it is identified that institutional change has accelerated since 1980s, and correctly 
estimating the relationship between institutional, international business, and economic 
outcomes has become increasingly challenging. Therefore, IV approach has firmly taken its 
place as a go-to technique in such empirical studies.  
In any instrumental variable estimation, a researcher tries to isolate exogeneous source of 
variation in the regressor (here, various institutional indices), and then compute unbiased 
estimators of its causal effect on the dependent variable (here, economic growth). The main 
concern is that institutions can be influenced by past realisations of economic growth, and 
therefore the OLS estimate of institutional effect will be inconsistent. Apart from Lipset’s 
(1959) idea, another prominent model of institutional endogeneity is suggested by Caplan 
(2003). His “idea trap” model involves the population that demands interventionist and 
exploitative economic policies following periods of poor growth and free-market policies after 
prolonged economic expansions. With opportunistic politicians that seek to be re-elected, 
Caplan (2003) shows that the equilibrium can be self-sustaining, with poor countries stuck with 
poor institutions, rich countries enjoying good institutions, and mid-income countries having 
average-quality institutions. Similarly, more recent studies showed that both Democratic-
Republican political cycles in the United States (and left-right wing party cycles in all other 
two-party democracies) as well as populist policies, and corresponding institutional change can 
be explained by rational electoral demands shifted by time-varying risk aversion and inequality 
aversion (Pastor and Veronesi, 2017, 2018). Therefore, it is obvious that any study that seeks 
to determine the causal effect of institutions on growth (and, all the more so, to assess 
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differential impact of a set of institutions) should isolate a source of exogenous variation in 
institutions.  
This study utilises a novel approach that, to the authors’ best knowledge, has not been yet 
applied to the empirical economic growth studies. It seeks to measure the institutions across the 
representative group of each country’s peers and treat this variable as “external pressure” that 
incentivises the government to bring its policies more in line with its counterparts and induce 
institutional change. As such change would be necessarily external, the TSLS estimate obtained 
from such an instrument will be consistent. This resonates with theoretical insights and 
suggestions in Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2019ab) and Aguilera and Groggard (2019), who propose 
that potential drivers of institutional change should be accounted for in empirical studies. 
The logic of “external pressure” as a source of exogenous variation also makes it applicable to 
a broad set of institutional parameters. If a particular country is not a democracy but borders or 
trades primarily with democracies, it can be pressurised, formally or informally, to become 
more democratic itself. Perhaps the clearest and most generalisable example is trade policy, 
taxation, and labour market regulations. If a particular country implements high tariffs, high 
corporate tax rates, or numerous labour protection laws, it might urge its trade partners that are 
more free-trade, have lower taxes, and have less rigid labour markets, to follow suit, or vice 
versa. Such reforms might also be a result of lobbying or informal influence by international 
business actors, as suggested in the studies of pro-market reforms (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2019a). 
A textbook case of such external political pressure being successful is the end of apartheid in 
South Africa, when international sanctions imposed by major trade partners induced political 
change (Levy, 1999). A recent study shows that external influence has been impactful in 
determining the outcome of the Arab Spring in Morocco (Abdel-Samad, 2014). However, 
external pressure might not always encourage productive political change. An equally vivid 
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anecdotal example might be Soviet tanks in Prague in 1968 that prematurely ended democratic-
socialist experiments of Alexander Dubcek and brought the Czechoslovakian policies of the 
time more in line with the authoritarian socialist regime of the Soviet Union (Williams, 1997). 
A formal model that offers an explanation why international political pressure can be effective 
in shaping political change is developed by Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988). Overall, the 
consensus view is that external influence can be effective to change domestic policy but not 
enough to affect foreign policy, as argued by Veebel and Markus (2015) for the case of Russia-
Ukraine tensions over the Crimea.  
The literature therefore allows the study to formalise two distinct sources of external pressure 
that might affect domestic institutions: economic and geographical. Imagine that there are 𝑛 
countries and 𝑚 distinct institutional measures. Then, 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 and 𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the economic and 
geographical pressure country 𝑖 receives with regards to institution 𝑗.  












Where 𝑋𝑖𝑘 constitutes the volume of exports from country 𝑖 to country 𝑘 in the most recent year 
available provided by the International Trade Centre, and 𝐼𝑘 is the institutional measure 𝑗 in 
country 𝑘. Note that the summation operator sums over all countries except 𝑖, therefore the 
country does not influence itself. Economic pressure, therefore, considers economic importance 
of various trade partners to country 𝑖 and its relative bargaining power or, alternatively, the need 
to synchronise policies (legal systems, tax codes, other policies, etc.) with major partner 
countries.  
Trade-related instrumental variables have a long and rich history of use in empirical economic 
development literature. In the 1990s, a wide variety of studies has emerged, trying to underpin 
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the causal effects of trade on growth. Hall and Jones (1999) use predicted trade volumes from 
a simple gravity model to instrument for actual trade flows and find that trade openness does 
positively affect growth. This study, in contrast, exploits variation in trade to isolate exogeneous 
differences in institutions that are relatable to economic pressure from trade partners. As 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 
is a relative measure that does not depend on total trade volumes, it does not account for trade-
related growth factors and can be interpreted as an instrument for institutions. Figure 1 below 
graphically represents the first stage for the example of property rights.  
Figure 1. First stage for property rights – economic (trade-weighted) external pressure index. 
 
It is reasonable, however, to doubt the exogeneity of such an instrument. Certainly, countries 
can to some extent control which countries do they trade with, and favour potential partners 
with closer political regimes. Therefore, 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 can represent a conscious policy choice rather 
than exogeneous pressure, causing a reverse causation issue. To reconcile this problem, one can 























External pressure on property rights
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countries over a reasonable period of time. Undertaking such an analysis might be worthy of a 
study of its own, nevertheless, as many institutional measures in question are discontinuous or 
started to have been computed recently, checking the pressure effectiveness hypothesis is 
unfeasible for the whole set of institutions investigated here. Notwithstanding, some indicators, 
predominantly Heritage measures of various economic freedom dimensions (though not all of 
them), have been available since 1995. Among twelve institutional measures Heritage currently 
considers, three (fiscal health, government integrity, and labour freedom) are unavailable for 
1995 due to methodology change. The overall index is also therefore incomparable, as it now 
includes twelve components instead of nine. However, nine measures, namely, property rights, 
judicial effectiveness, tax burden, government spending, business freedom, monetary freedom, 
trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom, are available both for 1995 and 
2019. Therefore, one can calculate exogeneous pressure (difference between trade-weighted 
institutional variable for partner countries and the country’s score) in 1995 and see if this 
measure is correlated with the change in respective indices of countries between 1995-2019. 
The data allows to test if external pressure has indeed caused countries to change their 
institutional frameworks on a 24-year time horizon. The sample is however markedly smaller 
for 1995, as data only on 98 countries is available. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to test this 
“institutional convergence” hypothesis. One can estimate the following regression equation:  
𝐼𝑖𝑗
2019 − 𝐼𝑖𝑗
1995 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗(𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗
1995 − 𝐼𝑖𝑗
1995) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑡  and 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑡  are the country’s 𝑖 score and external economic pressure that trade partners 
exercise over it in year 𝑡 with regard to institution 𝑗, 𝛼𝑗 is the intercept, 𝛽𝑗 is the pressure 
effectiveness measure, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term. The study is interested in the sign, magnitude, 
and significance of 𝛽𝑗. If it is positive and significant, it implies that countries indeed do change 
their institutions in response to external pressure. If it is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
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then it would mean that the external economic pressure instrument is endogenous and cannot 
be used.  
Figures 2 and 3 below shows this relationship for property rights and trade freedom on the 
scatterplot, while Table 1 below presents the results for all nine institutions for which data is 
available. It can be clearly seen that external economic pressure is indeed effective with regards 
to all nine variables, all 𝛽𝑗 coefficients being positive and statistically significant. For monetary 
and trade freedom, initial pressure in 1995 explains over 50% of the institutional change.  
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Figure 3. Evidence on the effectiveness of external economic pressure – trade freedom. 
 
Table 1. Evidence on the effectiveness of external economic pressure (1995-2019). 

































































Therefore, trade-weighted external pressure can be considered an exogenous instrument for 
institutions and used on par with the geographical measure that is defined and discussed below.  
 
Using external pressure as a source of exogenous variation: geographical distance 
For geographical pressure, the study considers inverse distance-weighted institutional measure 













−1 is the inverse distance between capitals of 𝑖 and 𝑘, computed as the length of a 
geodesic curve from latitudes and latitudes of cities. Geographic pressure instrument assigns a 
higher weight to closer countries, potentially incorporating threats of military influence 
(consider the tanks in Prague case). Unlike the trade-weighted instrument, this constructed 
variable is clearly exogenous by design: while governments can feasibly choose not to trade 
with countries that are not politically similar to them, they obviously cannot change their 
physical location and move away from them. The first-stage for the example of property rights 
index is graphically represented in Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4. First stage for property rights – geographical (inverse distance-weighted) external 
pressure index.  
 
The availability of trade data and geographic locations of country capitals allows the study to 
estimate econometric equations on much larger samples. Table 2 below shows the descriptive 
statistics on 26 institutional variables this study utilises. As can be seen, World Justice Project 
variables allows to include 120 companies into the sample, while Polity project, World 
Economic Forum, and Heritage data allow for more than 160 data points in case of each and 
every indicator, estimating the following equations: 
𝐼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 























External pressure on property rights
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Institutional variable Source Number of observations Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Economic freedom Heritage 173 61.06 60.70 10.62 25.90 90.20 
Property rights Heritage 178 52.76 50.35 19.54 7.60 97.40 
Judicial effectiveness Heritage 178 45.15 42.90 17.95 10.00 92.40 
Government integrity Heritage 178 41.53 35.50 20.11 7.90 96.70 
Tax burden Heritage 173 77.45 78.00 11.97 42.00 99.80 
Government spending Heritage 176 64.71 68.90 22.52 0.00 96.60 
Fiscal health Heritage 176 65.68 80.00 31.70 0.00 100.00 
Business freedom Heritage 178 63.59 63.40 15.38 17.70 96.40 
Labour freedom Heritage 177 59.50 59.50 13.83 20.00 91.00 
Monetary freedom Heritage 177 75.31 77.70 9.85 0.00 88.00 
Trade freedom Heritage 175 74.84 76.60 11.07 45.00 95.00 
Investment freedom Heritage 176 57.39 60.00 22.48 0.00 95.00 
Financial freedom Heritage 173 49.42 50.00 19.19 10.00 90.00 
Polity index Polity IV 161 5.96 7.00 3.72 0.00 10.00 
Constraint on the executive Polity IV 161 5.22 6.00 1.96 0.00 7.00 
Legal origins La-Porta et al. (2008) 178 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Ease of doing business World Economic Forum 174 62.07 62.75 13.76 19.98 86.59 
Rule of law World Justice Project 120 0.56 0.52 0.14 0.28 0.90 
Constraint on government World Justice Project 120 0.55 0.53 0.16 0.18 0.95 
Absence of corruption World Justice Project 120 0.51 0.46 0.19 0.18 0.95 
Government openness World Justice Project 120 0.53 0.50 0.15 0.22 0.88 
Fundamental rights World Justice Project 120 0.57 0.56 0.16 0.25 0.92 
Order and security World Justice Project 120 0.72 0.72 0.13 0.30 0.93 
Regulation enforcement World Justice Project 120 0.54 0.50 0.15 0.20 0.90 
Civil justice World Justice Project 120 0.55 0.53 0.14 0.23 0.87 
Criminal justice World Justice Project 120 0.47 0.44 0.16 0.14 0.84 
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Table 3 below presents first-stage regressions for all 26 institutional variables for two candidate 
instruments (economic and geographical pressure).  
Table 3. First-stage regressions. 
Indicator 



















































































0.2055 176 (6.4498) (6.7081) 
0.0000 0.0000 











0.2439 161 (6.2562) (7.1624) 
0.0000 0.0000 











0.0395 178 (3.2300) (2.6904) 
0.0015 0.0078 





0.3657 174 (5.4713) (9.9591) 
0.0000 0.0000 


























































0.3217 120 (5.4098) (7.4801) 
0.0000 0.0000 
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In can be clearly seen that both candidate instruments have sufficiently strong first stages. The 
only statistically insignificant regression comes from monetary freedom in case of geographical 
pressure. However, the relationship between monetary freedom and economic pressure remains 
sufficiently strong. Overall, 45 out of 52 first-stage regressions comfortably exceed the t-stat 
threshold of three, suggesting the applicability of IV estimations with economic and 
geographical external pressure as instruments. 
Another concern regarding the applicability of these pressure-related instrumental variables is 
the uniformity of pressure effectiveness across countries. It is not unreasonable to presume 
some countries might be more responsive to pressure than others. For economic pressure, trade-
dependent countries (with higher trade-to-GDP ratios) can be more easily swayed, while for 
geographic pressure, surrounded countries (that have multiple bordering countries) might be 
more affected. To test for this, the study considers trade-to-GDP ratio (most recent figure 




 as absolute pressure measures and 
estimates the following equations with interaction terms: 
𝐼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 






If 𝛾𝑗 are positive and significant, then there are heterogeneities in terms of pressure 
effectiveness, and it must be reflected in the design of instrumental variable sets. 
Table 4 below reports the results of regressions with interaction terms: 
Table 4. First-stage regressions with interaction terms. 
Indicator 
Economic pressure Geographical pressure 






0.1638 (4.3175) (3.5542) (4.3801) (-0.3391) 
0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.7352 





0.3146 (4.1736) (2.9814) (6.2622) (-1.2125) 






0.2149 (2.2551) (2.1928) (5.0567) (-0.9258) 






0.3690 (3.0596) (2.4257) (7.2502) (-1.4991) 





0.3022 (5.0419) (1.15) (6.8604) (1.0526) 






0.5130 (6.885) (-0.5178) (10.4899) (2.0097) 





0.0902 (1.7971) (1.776) (1.5252) (1.6211) 





0.2804 (3.8465) (2.529) (6.1443) (-0.4334) 





0.0755 (1.708) (2.4402) (2.6688) (-1.2517) 






0.0136 (2.4137) (1.9927) (0.8359) (0.0982) 





0.2750 (4.9944) (3.8335) (5.8477) (-0.0284) 






0.2172 (4.3188) (2.2404) (4.4606) (-0.5309) 





0.1815 (3.0345) (2.8263) (4.5128) (-1.5095) 





0.1624 (3.8161) (-0.8154) (3.8697) (-0.6553) 
0.0002 0.4166 0.0002 0.5137 





0.1346 (4.0855) (-0.7904) (3.6658) (-0.1821) 






(1.7631) (-0.0238) (3.3783) (-1.9099) 
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0.0807 0.9810 0.0010 0.0587 





0.3773 (4.8653) (3.1648) (7.407) (-0.9658) 
0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.3362 




0.3594 (4.1697) (2.0155) (7.2923) (-1.8251) 






0.2304 (3.4787) (0.684) (5.6032) (-1.5681) 






0.3710 (3.9624) (2.2577) (7.4512) (-1.7811) 






0.3619 (5.1508) (0.4032) (7.6862) (-2.1525) 






0.3451 (3.7741) (1.6602) (6.8728) (-1.5694) 






0.3591 (4.0713) (4.3571) (6.7605) (-1.5657) 






0.2658 (3.631) (1.9901) (5.9028) (-1.2979) 





0.2690 (3.6732) (1.9299) (5.8429) (-1.1984) 





0.3656 (4.2047) (2.3532) (6.8972) (-1.5512) 





0.8823 (76.1285) (9.4378) (74.1640) (0.2522) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6119 
 
Only two out of 26 interaction terms have significant estimators in case of geographical pressure 
instruments (government spending and government openness). Moreover, the estimator for 
government openness is of the sign opposite to what the initial theoretical presumption is. The 
coefficient for the overall sample is also insignificant. Therefore, geographic pressure 
effectiveness can be considered independent of pressure intensity. Economic pressure, on the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497642 
other hand, is largely positively affected by countries’ trade-to-GDP ratio: the interaction term 
is positive and statistically significant (at 5%) for 15 out of 26 institutional variables and 
positive and statistically significant for the whole sample. Therefore, the institutional variable 
set must be corrected for this heterogeneous effect.  
In the next section, the method derived and instrumental variables defined are applied to 
“unbundle” the effect of 26 institutions on economic growth of sample countries.    
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Findings and discussion 
In this section, the model estimation results are presented and the effect of 26 institutional measures on growth is considered.  
Table 5 below presents the results of IV model estimations, including the TSLS equations with interaction terms for economic pressure, reflecting 
the evidence of pressure heterogeneity based on trade openness derived in Table 4 in the previous section. As advised by Young (2017), IV 
estimators are compared with corresponding OLS coefficients, while endogeneity and weak instruments are explicitly tested using Durbin-Wu-
Hausman statistic (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981) and Cragg-Donald F-stat (Cragg and Donald, 1993), respectively. The standard errors are 
adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity using White (1980) covariance matrix, following Acemoglu et al. (2014).  
Table 5. Model estimation results. 
Indicator OLS 























48.2413 (11.4834) (6.1012) (5.2423) (-0.4917) (7.9812) 










81.8432 (15.3397) (7.6593) (5.7538) (-0.6668) (10.8627) 











49.0934 (10.9613) (3.6511) (2.7566) (-0.3468) (7.6416) 











82.0061 (13.4463) (5.9625) (4.5697) (-0.4652) (10.2589) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.6424 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 










67.7856 (-2.1105) (-1.8148) (-2.1383) (5.0868) (-1.7897) 











55.2848 (-6.1477) (-4.2588) (-4.7627) (2.6327) (-5.9878) 










6.6828 (3.5999) (2.2171) (1.1759) (-0.1786) (2.6081) 










56.7038 (12.3891) (6.2692) (5.2705) (-0.0603) (8.7792) 










10.3866 (3.9801) (2.2594) (1.8080) (0.7739) (2.8466) 











0.5432 (5.1587) (2.3024) (2.0500) (0.0984) (0.7735) 










83.2776 (9.7433) (5.9237) (4.9525) (-0.9028) (8.1043) 











44.9991 (7.7246) (4.5616) (3.1872) (1.9431) (6.1547) 










46.6289 (10.2256) (4.9455) (4.0634) (0.6492) (7.5248) 








(4.6342) (2.4848) (-0.0140) (3.9015) (4.7875) 
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0.0000 0.0140 0.6292 0.9889 0.0001 0.0362 0.0000 0.0005 










43.7153 (3.4551) (3.0005) (1.1544) (3.8851) (4.3892) 










7.2384 (2.4389) (-1.0231) (-1.9367) (3.2606) (-0.1709) 
0.0157 0.3077 0.0720 0.0545 0.0013 0.0026 0.8645 0.5001 










99.1828 (12.9702) (7.0010) (5.4251) (-0.0346) (9.7812) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.9724 0.0010 0.0000 0.0030 









55.1034 (13.1006) (7.0391) (6.2053) (-1.0228) (8.9366) 











30.7288 (9.1690) (4.3301) (3.7458) (1.6758) (6.1380) 











57.5318 (13.7001) (7.3916) (6.4811) (-1.5938) (9.6667) 











55.4338 (10.9326) (6.2015) (5.5237) (1.3396) (8.1936) 











54.9594 (9.9277) (5.2482) (4.4273) (0.5824) (7.4224) 











53.6243 (7.9476) (5.8508) (4.8579) (-2.2806) (6.1614) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0127 
7.3989 12.8362 12.3130 17.1375 13.2408 -0.5517 11.4425 8.6482 10.0065 6.0869 36.8377 
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Regulation 
enforcement 
(12.5296) (5.9050) (5.4066) (-1.2913) (7.6568) 










36.7652 (12.0213) (6.3140) (5.4537) (-1.3501) (7.5018) 










55.9518 (11.5342) (6.7043) (5.7433) (-0.9727) (7.6404) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 0.3328 0.0280 0.0000 0.1273 
Notes: OLS and TSLS estimations of institutional impact on economic growth with economic (trade-weighted) and geographic (inverse distance-
weighted) external pressure as instruments. T-stats are reported (in parentheses) and p-values are presented in italics. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981) and Cragg-Donald F-stat (Cragg and Donald, 1993) are used to determine regressor endogeneity and weak 
instruments, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(White, 1980).  
 
The results show that institutional variables are highly endogenous, and therefore OLS estimators of their effect on growth are biased. For economic 
pressure, economic pressure with an interaction term, and geographic pressure 22, 23, and 24 institutional indicators out of 26 are proven to be 
endogenous as per Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981). Only tax burden, investment freedom, constraint on the executive, 
legal origins, constraint on government, fundamental rights, and criminal justice (7 out of 26 variables) can be considered exogenous for at least 
one of the models, with tax burden alone reliably classified as exogenous for all three. The instrumental variables developed earlier in the study 
can be considered sufficiently strong, with 22, 17, and 23 of them comfortably exceeding the conventional Cragg-Donald F-statistic threshold of 
10 (Cragg and Donald, 1993). Fiscal health, monetary freedom, and legal origins demonstrate some signs of weak instruments, while all other 
estimations can be reliably used for inference. Hence, both major issues with IV techniques identified in Young (2017) are successfully avoided in 
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the design of this study, with instruments both having sufficiently strong first stages and effectively demonstrating the endogeneity of the 
institutional variables considered.  
Another potential concern with TSLS models might be that respective IV estimators are not statistically and economically different from 
corresponding OLS estimators, therefore rendering the benefits of TSLS approach questionable at most (Young, 2017). To address that, the study 
calculates average differences between TSLS and OLS estimators both across all models and across models with sufficiently strong instruments 
only. Table 6 presents the respective results. In all cases, TSLS estimators are at least 50% higher than respective OLS coefficients, with all 
differences being statistically and economically significant. For purposes of further inference, the geographical pressure instruments are used, as 
they are the strongest (evidenced by higher Cragg-Donald F-statistics and 𝑅2 values in first-stage regressions) and the most efficient in identifying 
endogeneity.  
 




Mean difference Standard error p-value 
All estimators 
Economic pressure 26 91.35% 27.11% 0.0025 
Economic pressure + interaction term 26 79.25% 40.14% 0.0599 
Geographic pressure 26 158.45% 80.82% 0.0616 
Only sufficiently 
strong instruments 
Economic pressure 22 49.20% 23.01% 0.0450 
Economic pressure + interaction term 17 54.21% 17.15% 0.0065 
Geographic pressure 23 80.98% 19.70% 0.0005 
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One of the most common and valid criticisms of the institutional theory of economic growth and development is the human capital theory. As such, 
Glaeser et al. (2004) first criticised Acemoglu et al. (2001) log settler mortality approach as it affects not only the initial institutional mix, but also 
the initial stock of human capital in the ex-colonies. Despite the instruments proposed by this study cannot be theoretically correlated with human 
capital, it still opts to use human capital controls as an additional robustness check to test the validity of the results and present evidence of the 
relevance of “unbundled institutions” effect against the most common competing theory.  
The existing literature reports mixed findings regarding the effect of human capital on growth. It is a well-stated empirical fact that private returns 
to a year of schooling (the increase in individuals’ earnings when they attain school or a higher education institution for an additional year, the so-
called “micro-Mincer” relationship) is somewhere between 7% and 10% (Mincer, 1974; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). 
There is a significant debate that is still unresolved on to which extent education is contributing to national income, however, i.e., on the “macro-
Mincer” relationship. If the “macro-Mincer” elasticity of national income on the average years of schooling is significantly greater than the “micro-
Mincer” elasticity for private income, then education can be considered generating substantial positive externalities, and there is scope of 
subsidising educational attainment and funding educational institutions from state tax revenue (Hsieh and Klenlow, 2010; Caplan, 2018). Various 
studies report contradictory evidence. As such, Hsieh and Klenlow (2010) estimate the macro-Mincer coefficient at 20-30%. Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2014) use compulsory schooling laws to derive instruments for educational attainment and compute macro-Mincer at 9%, only marginally higher 
than their micro-Mincer coefficient of 7%. Caplan (2018) argues that social returns of education are smaller than private returns, interpreting it as 
evidence in favour of the signaling model of education. Acemoglu et al. (2014) report median OLS estimates at 26.3%, median TSLS estimates at 
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20.4% when controlled for rule of law as their institutional measure, using protestant missionaries, capped log settler mortality, and log initial 
population density as instruments. Therefore, the study opts to control for human capital to provide additional comparability with existing studies. 
There exist multiple potentially valid measures of human capital, including years of schooling, the percentage of educated labour force, and 
education investment as % of GDP (Barro, 2001; Barro and Lee, 2013). They are readily available from World Bank Development indicators 
database or from Barro and Lee (2013) for 161, 142, and 174 countries of the sample, respectively, therefore enabling the robustness check. To 
determine which of the human capital measures to utilise as a control, IV regressions with all three are run. Table 7 below presents the results.  
Table 7. Human capital and growth 
 
 Years of schooling Educated, % labour force 
Education investment,  
% of GDP 
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
Coefficient 
0.4151 0.4593 0.0248 0.0323 0.1909 0.8705 
(19.5164) (14.4345) (1.4229) (0.5161) (3.0605) (4.1304) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1570 0.6066 0.0026 0.0001 
Endogeneity 
3.0436 0.0131 16.1893 
0.0811 0.9088 0.0001 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 166.5054 9.4536 16.1893 
 
Among the three measures, two – years of schooling and education investment – have both significant effects in OLS and TSLS estimations, show 
signs of endogeneity and strong first-stage. As the relationship for years of schooling is much more pronounced and this measure is more frequently 
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used in human capital studies (Hsieh and Klenlow, 2010; Barro and Lee, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2014), the study opts to use it as a control in 
further estimations to obtain more conservative estimates for institutional effects1. The OLS and TSLS estimator obtained (41.5% and 45.9%) are 
much greater than 26.4% or 30% reported by Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Hsieh and Kudlow (2010), respectively. It potentially identifies the 
aforementioned theoretical issues with protestant missions as an instrument for human capital, as protestant missionary activity might be causing 
democracy as well (Woodberry and Shah, 2004; Woodberry, 2012). The instrument used by this study (geographical pressure) is directly education-
related and therefore is free from this endogeneity bias, while respective Durbin-Wu-Hausman and Cragg-Donald test evidence its general validity. 
Table 8a. Robustness check – institutional effects with human capital controls.  




OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
Institutions 
0.0455 0.0535 0.0319 0.0242 0.0259 0.0200 0.0301 0.0260 -0.0106 -0.0071 -0.0100 -0.0067 0.0028 0.0204 
(5.6992) (2.2275) (6.1530) (2.0741) (6.3578) (1.8939) (9.0912) (3.2990) (-1.4748) (-0.4974) (-2.7057) (-0.1706) (1.1881) (0.6535) 
0.0000 0.0274 0.0000 0.0397 0.0000 0.0601 0.0000 0.0012 0.1450 0.6196 0.0076 0.8647 0.2366 0.5144 
Human 
capital 
0.3188 0.3435 0.2592 0.3371 0.3286 0.3969 0.2910 0.3455 0.4087 0.4521 0.3774 0.4183 0.4051 0.3563 
(12.7153) (6.3470) (8.3645) (5.2785) (13.3580) (9.4754) (12.0470) (7.7786) (19.3681) (13.1373) (15.3291) (1.6697) (17.9017) (2.2193) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0970 0.0000 0.0279 
Endogeneity 
3.4011 3.5813 5.3107 3.0359 2.6030 0.8255 2.8763 
0.1826 0.1669 0.0703 0.2192 0.2721 0.6618 0.2374 
Cragg-
Donald  
5.9473 8.3261 11.8226 18.7096 29.8180 0.4500 0.4618 
 
                                                 
1 The study also estimated the equations with educated labour force and educational investment as human capital measures, and the results for institutional variables were 
even more statistically and economically significant than in the case of years of schooling.  
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Table 8b. Robustness check – institutional effects with human capital controls.  
 
Business freedom Labour freedom Monetary freedom Trade freedom Investment freedom Financial freedom  
 OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
Institutions 0.0340 0.0267 0.0101 -0.0151 0.0245 -0.3496 0.0301 0.0295 0.0141 0.0171 0.0211 0.0496 
 (6.2201) (1.4476) (1.8770) (-0.7118) (2.5569) (-0.1625) (3.2789) (1.8966) (3.9118) (1.7306) (5.3976) (3.1994) 
 0.0000 0.1497 0.0624 0.4776 0.0115 0.8711 0.0013 0.0597 0.0001 0.0855 0.0000 0.0017 
Human capital 0.2993 0.3642 0.3997 0.4739 0.3931 0.7746 0.3502 0.3817 0.3705 0.4027 0.3386 0.2769 
 (11.5563) (5.2569) (16.8573) (11.6349) (18.6359) (0.4002) (12.8973) (8.6267) (17.0557) (9.0583) (14.8193) (4.5230) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6897 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity 2.8293  5.3452  3.4942  1.5757  3.0736  5.7358  
 0.2430  0.0691  0.1743  0.4548  0.2151  0.0568  
Cragg-Donald 4.9026  4.5941  0.0106  15.0841  11.2914  15.0841  
 
Table 8c. Robustness check – institutional effects with human capital controls.  
 Polity index 
Constraint on  
the executive 
Legal origins 
Ease of doing 
business 





OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
Institutions 
0.0295 0.0119 0.0378 -0.0211 0.2321 1.1600 0.0299 -0.0017 4.3352 1.9398 2.8578 2.3083 3.5373 2.6723 
(1.1100) (0.1926) (0.7265) (-0.1557) (1.3049) (1.2990) (3.6179) (-0.1141) (6.6674) (1.1503) (5.8149) (1.6456) (7.6797) (2.1456) 
0.2688 0.8475 0.4687 0.8765 0.1938 0.1958 0.0004 0.9093 0.0000 0.2524 0.0000 0.1026 0.0000 0.0340 
Human 
capital 
0.3993 0.4544 0.4056 0.4656 0.4105 0.4809 0.3141 0.4653 0.2736 0.3931 0.3352 0.3950 0.2628 0.3361 
(16.0919) (10.1354) (16.4653) (9.8211) (18.7473) (12.6435) (9.7607) (7.7596) (9.2537) (5.5761) (13.4470) (7.4039) (9.7555) (5.0043) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity 
3.8044 3.8076 6.1462 4.3082 4.5293 2.9249 1.5292 
0.1492 0.1490 0.0463 0.1160 0.1039 0.2317 0.4655 
Cragg-
Donald  
16.3815 12.4911 3.5136 8.9804 10.6963 8.0138 7.6316 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497642 
Table 8d. Robustness check – institutional effects with human capital controls.  
 Government openness Fundamental rights Order and security Regulation enforcement Civil justice Criminal justice 
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
Institutions 
3.1924 3.4169 2.8037 2.0011 2.0009 -2.2537 4.0383 1.9382 3.8909 1.1459 3.3346 -0.4217 
(5.1875) (2.4902) (4.1097) (1.3724) (3.1257) (-1.0789) (7.2943) (1.3359) (5.8119) (0.5736) (5.6527) (-0.2692) 
0.0000 0.0142 0.0000 0.1726 0.0023 0.2829 0.0000 0.1842 0.0000 0.5674 0.0000 0.7883 
Human capital 
0.3081 0.3342 0.3249 0.3905 0.3660 0.5317 0.2832 0.3979 0.2909 0.4258 0.2984 0.4790 
(10.4411) (5.3093) (10.7631) (6.0502) (13.0838) (6.9446) (10.5271) (6.7751) (9.3280) (5.9518) (10.3409) (6.4167) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity 
1.6028 2.2407 5.7119 6.0707 5.9188 10.0541 
0.4487 0.3262 0.0575 0.0481 0.0518 0.0066 
Cragg-Donald  11.1216 13.5733 8.2905 8.2001 6.6910 11.5836 
 
Tables 8a-d above demonstrate the causal effect of institutions on growth when controlled for human capital. Human capital is shown to be an 
important determinant of economic growth. Only eight institutional variables – economic freedom, property rights, judicial effectiveness, 
government integrity, investment freedom, financial freedom, absence of corruption, and government openness – from the initial 26 retain statistical 
significance when human capital is accounted for. Notably, rule of law – the variable used to proxy for institutions in Acemoglu et al. (2014) –  is 
of smaller magnitude in comparison to this study (1.94 against a median estimate of 1.12), yet statistically insignificant. This might be a result of 
a smaller sample and a different instrumental variable derivation strategy in Acemoglu et al. (2014). For eight significant indicators, TSLS 
estimators are on average 68% lower than the respective coefficients reported in Table 5, implying that a lot of variation, albeit not all, that could 
be initially explained by institutions is in fact attributable to human capital. The findings of this study are more favourable to 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497642 
human capital than Acemoglu et al. (2014) – in their estimations, the coefficient on rule of law 
decreases from 1.35 to 1.12 (a 17% reduction, compared to 68% reduction reported above). The 
human capital estimates in this study are 24.5% lower than the TSLS estimate not accounting 
for institutions, very similar to 22.4% reduction reported by Acemoglu et al. (2014).  
Overall, the findings of the study reinforce the consensus in the literature that institutions do 
matter for business and economic outcomes, while human capital, being a significant 
determinant as well, cannot explain all variations initially attributed to institutions. 
Furthermore, this study sheds some light on the long-standing problem of “unbundling 
institutions”, evidencing the primary impact of property rights protection, absence from 
corruption, financial liberalisation, and government integrity and openness. That is consistent 
with the findings of Bhattacharyya (2009), verifying the claim that market-creating and market-
stabilising institutions matter the most for growth, as well as with Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005), arguing that property rights institutions (or, as they call them “political” institutions) 
are more important than contracting institutions. However, the study suggests that, unlike 
constraint on the executive and rule of law indicators predominantly used in the field, property 
rights, judicial effectiveness, government integrity, investment and financial freedom indices 
by Heritage, as well as absence of corruption and government openness by World Justice 
Project, yield considerably higher explanatory power over economic outcomes.  
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Conclusion 
This study has successfully fulfilled its research objective and addressed the challenges in 
institutional research in international business and economics identified by scholars in the field 
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008; Aguilera and Groggard, 2019; 
Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019ab). 
 It has developed a novel technique to derive institution-specific instrumental variables, using 
trade and geographic data to formalise and quantify the concept of external pressure exerted on 
governments by other states that might lead to reforms and institutional change that are relevant 
for the economic environment international businesses operate in (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2019a). It has found that among 26 different institutional variables initially considered, 
economic freedom, property rights, judicial effectiveness, government integrity, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, absence of corruption, and government openness are robust and 
significant causal determinants of economic growth, as evidenced by TSLS estimates with 
human capital controls. The application of this new method reinforces some findings of existing 
research on “unbundling institutions”, such as the relative importance of market-creating and 
market-stabilising institutions (Bhattacharyya, 2009) and the primacy of property rights 
institutions over contracting institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
The study has broad implications for academics, business practitioners, and policymakers alike. 
For academics, it shows the applicability of external pressure as an instrument for institutions, 
that might be used in future international business and economics research to evaluate the 
impact of other factors, such as cultural dimensions or informal institutional arrangements, on 
various outcomes, as well as to investigate the phenomenon of institutional change and drift. 
For international business managers, this study has provided additional insight into the business 
context of economic, political, and legal environment and can inform strategic decision-making 
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on host country-MNE bargaining. For policymakers, this study can serve as an initial guide for 
prioritisation in terms of growth-enhancing reforms and investment promotion policies.   
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